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This paper traces the evolution of Spanish political nationalism since the country’s 
democratic transition.  By examining the nationalist discourses of Spain’s two main political 
parties, the Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE) and the Partido Popular (PP), this 
paper identifies historic trends, ideological and philosophical influences, and sources of 
division within each party.  The author argues that each party’s respective discourse has been 
shaped by four factors: historians’ interpretations of Spain’s national identity and past; 
political alignment on the Left or Right; whether the party belongs to the government or the 
opposition; and the degree of reliance on peripheral nationalist parties for electoral success.  
This paper contributes to the debate about the existence of Spanish political nationalism, as 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
 For nearly forty years, Francisco Franco’s authoritarian regime promoted Castilian 
Spanish, the Catholic faith, and the right-wing ideology as the essence of the Spanish nation.  
At the same time, the dictatorship denied Spain’s cultural and linguistic diversity, reducing 
peripheral nationalisms to “mere folkloristic expressions of regional specificities” (Muñoz, 
2007, p. 5).  This illiberal imposition of nationalism, paired with the repression of cultural 
and linguistic expression, led to the delegitimization of Spanish nationalism and the 
simultaneous empowerment of the peripheral nationalists by the time of Spain’s democratic 
transition in the late 1970s (Núñez Seixas, 2001, p. 721).  During the transition and for years 
afterward, Spanish nationalist discourse all but disappeared from the public sphere, including 
public statements and speeches of political parties and leaders.   
Today, Spanish nationalism continues to be a delicate subject.  The state’s main 
political parties have been struggling since the 1980s to reintroduce the concept of Spain as a 
nation in an attempt to foster national unity.  While reluctant to use the term ‘nationalism,’ 
the two main parties have equally tried to create a sense of unity around the Constitution of 
1978 through an ideology known as constitutional patriotism.  Both parties have converged 
on the concept of the Constitution as the basis of the Spanish nation and as the source of its 
political legitimacy.  However, they differ in their respective interpretations of the concept, 
particularly regarding Spain’s authoritarian history. 
In this paper, I explore the debate on Spanish political nationalism since the 
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transition, as seen from the point of view of the country’s two main political parties, the 
center-left Partido Socialista Obrero Español (Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party, or PSOE) 
and the center-right Partido Popular (Popular Party, or PP).  Through this exploration, I seek 
to address two main questions.  First, what have been the main nationalist discourses of these 
two parties since the transition?  And second, what factors have motivated each party’s 
respective discourse and actions? 
In order to answer the first question, I examine the evolution of each party’s 
nationalist discourse since the transition, highlighting the legacy of Franco, ideological and 
philosophical influences, internal divisions, and the role of history in shaping national 
identity.  In particular, I look at how the debate—or lack thereof—on the historical memory 
of Spain’s Civil War and the Francoist dictatorship has influenced the PSOE and PP’s 
concept of the nation. 
In response to my second research question, I argue that these parties’ nationalist 
discourses are shaped by a number of factors, which include historians’ interpretations of 
Spain’s national identity and past; political alignment on the Left or Right; whether the party 
is part of the government or the opposition; and the degree of reliance on peripheral 
nationalist parties for electoral success. 
Since the transition, there has been a heated debate over the existence of Spain as a 
nation and over the existence of Spanish nationalism.  Along with a number of academics, I 
contend that Spanish nationalism does, in fact, exist, albeit in a less visible form than in other 
nations or regions.  Several scholars of Spanish nationalism (Núñez Seixas, 2005; Balfour 
and Quiroga, 2007) point to Michael Billig’s concept of banal nationalism to explain its so-
called ‘invisibility’ in Spain.  Billig (1995) argues that nationalism is not always represented 
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in a flagrant way, as extreme nationalists and separatist movements might suggest.  Instead, 
nationalism is present on an everyday basis, often beyond citizens’ conscious awareness, 
manifested through minor and often unnoticed reminders, such as the use of a common 
language or loyalty to a national sports team. 
However, for the purposes of this paper, my focus is on Spanish political nationalism, 
rather than popular manifestations of its presence in society.  Therefore, I look specifically at 
the more visible and public displays of nationalism, such as speeches and/or articles written 
by political leaders, proposed legislation, and other actions taken to promote identification 
with the Spanish nation. 
Today, Spanish nationalism is one of the least researched areas of Spanish politics. 
While there is a plethora of literature about the peripheral nationalisms, there is not a great 
deal written about Spanish nationalism as a political phenomenon today.  Among its leading 
experts are political scientist Andrés de Blas Guerrero and historian Xosé-Manoel Núñez 
Seixas.  Antonio Morales Moya (2001) attributes this lack of research to Spanish 
nationalism’s identification with the Francoist dictatorship; despite the success of the 
democratic transition, the approval of the 2007 Law on Historical Memory, and other steps 
towards ‘reconciliation,’ the Civil War, the dictatorship, and other aspects of Spain’s dark 
past continue to be delicate subjects. 
Continued pressures from the peripheral nationalists, the increasingly charged debate 
on Constitutional reform, and the mounting need for a shared concept of the Spanish nation 
all make Spanish political nationalism a topic worthy of investigation and relevant to the 
study of European politics.  This paper aims to contribute precisely to this sparsely 
researched area of Spanish politics.   
II. THE PSOE’S ‘NEO-PATRIOTISM’ 
 
By the time of Franco’s death in 1975, it seemed as though Spanish nationalism had 
died with him.  Largely discredited by the dictatorship’s imposition of national-Catholicism, 
Spanish nationalism had been all but converted into a taboo.  While the mainstream parties of 
the democratic Right moderated their nationalist rhetoric, the PSOE and other leftist parties 
avoided the subject altogether.  As a result of pressures from the recently vindicated Basques 
and Catalans, as well as out of its own electoral interests, the PSOE sided with the peripheral 
nationalists and lent its support to the project of political decentralization during the 
democratic transition. 
 While the transition has been called a period of great compromise for many members 
of Spanish society, the PSOE in particular made many compromises, adapting its stance 
towards nationalism, the state model, and its own political ideology during this time.  These 
changes were, in many ways, opportune since they allowed the PSOE to establish itself as 
one of Spain’s main political parties at the national level, leading to its election in 1982.   
Since the 1980s, PSOE leaders have realized the need to rejuvenate Spanish national 
pride and patriotism, with leaders like former President Felipe González working to reclaim 
the sentiment and later with the party’s espousal of constitutional patriotism. 
Today, the PSOE emphasizes two main points in its concept of the nation (Núñez 
Seixas, 2007, pp. 161-162).  First, it differentiates between the so-called ‘political nation’ (in 
this case, Spain) and the ‘cultural nation’ (Catalonia, the Basque Country, etc.).  From this 
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idea, the PSOE has developed the image of Spain as a ‘nation of nations.’  Second, the PSOE 
emphasizes Spain’s connections with Europe, implying a more cosmopolitan identity that can 
be shared by all Spaniards regardless of their regional identification.  
It is important to note that, while the PSOE is a national party, its regional federations 
often have their own agendas in addition to social democracy.  For example, the Partido 
Socialista de Euskadi - Euskadiko Ezkerra (Socialist Party of the Basque Country, or PSE-
EE) regards itself as both a socialist and Basque nationalist party.  It aims to promote social 
welfare in the region, while facilitating dialogue between the Basques and the central 
government.  Among the party’s objectives is the “self-governance of the Basques within the 
framework of solidarity and cooperation with the rest of Spain’s peoples” (PSE-EE, 2008).  
Similar parties exist in several other regions.  For the purposes of this paper, I focus on the 
PSOE at the national level.  References to the party’s regional federations are clearly 
indicated. 
2.1 The Transition and the PSOE’s Political Shuffling 
The PSOE leadership took a number of steps during the transition and the years 
immediately following to ensure future electoral success.  Firstly, it won the favor of the 
peripheral nationalists by conceding to many of their demands and essentially rejecting 
Spanish nationalism.  Secondly, it altered its political ideology as an originally Marxist, 
republican party, instead becoming a more moderate, social democratic party of the 
mainstream.  One issue, however, that remained disputed for many years was the PSOE’s 
take on the state model. 
The PSOE and the Peripheral Nationalists 
During the transition, the PSOE and other left-wing parties—most prominently 
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Spain’s Communist Party (the PCE)—experienced what political scientist Andrés de Blas 
Guerrero (1989) calls a “philo-nationalist enthusiasm,” or a strong partiality for the 
peripheral nationalists.  Blas Guerrero attributes this so-called enthusiasm to the “bad 
conscience” that permeated Spanish society and made many leaders more receptive to the 
demands of Basque and Catalan nationalists, despite the fact that the oppression they had 
suffered under Franco had not been “qualitatively distinct […] in relation to the rest of the 
state” (p. 106).  I, however, argue that it was not so much guilt, but rather political 
opportunism, that drove the PSOE and other parties of the Left to side with the nationalists. 
As mentioned previously, Franco’s regime had severely repressed the cultural and 
linguistic rights of the peripheral nationalists.  Moreover, these nationalists had played an 
important role in the opposition to the dictatorship.  As a result of these two factors, the 
peripheral nationalists had earned a great deal of popular support.  At the same time, the 
dictatorship’s imposition of national-Catholicism had largely discredited Spanish 
nationalism.  Naturally, it was of greater benefit to side with the ‘winners,’ so the PSOE did 
what it could to ally itself with the peripheral nationalists. 
In addition to favoring regional identification over identification with the Spanish 
nation, the PSOE temporarily became a great proponent of the regions’ right to self-
determination.  This stemmed, in part, from the Left’s defense of self-determination in 
postcolonial countries throughout the 1950s and 1960s (Balfour and Quiroga, 2007, p. 137).  
In 1975, the PCE defended the right to self-determination of the ‘historical’ regions of 
Catalonia, the Basque Country, and Galicia, and the following year the PSOE went a step 
further, defending the right to self-determination of all of Spain’s regions and nationalities 
(Pastor Verdú, 2007, p. 196).   
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This came at a time when ‘autonomous regionalisms’ were appearing throughout 
Spain.  These regionalisms, in places such as Aragon, Navarre, and Andalusia, had not 
existed previously as political movements.  During the transition, they emerged in reaction to 
the demands of the historical regions.  Instead of calling for greater autonomy, the leaders of 
these movements demanded that their regions be granted the same level of autonomy as the 
Basque Country, Catalonia, and Galicia (Núñez Seixas, 1999, pp. 152-53). 
However, when it came time to sign the Constitution in 1978, both the PCE and 
PSOE abandoned their support of self-determination for the regions.  Perhaps both realized 
that such a concession was too drastic considering the number of regionalist and nationalist 
movements, and it implied real risks for the Spanish state, such as the separation of the 
Basque and Catalan regions.  Instead, the PCE and PSOE expressed their backing for 
decentralization. 
The PSOE’s defense of the nationalists was a clearly pragmatic decision.  By the late 
1970s and early 1980s, various regionalist and nationalist groups had integrated into the 
party, facilitating its electoral success throughout the 1980s (Balfour y Quiroga, 2007, p. 
141).  In the first half of the 1990s, the PSOE would come to depend on the political support 
of Basque and Catalan nationalists, as it would no longer have a majority in the government.  
The PSOE’s Ideological Alterations 
Originally a Marxist party, the PSOE moderated its ideological basis during the 
transition so that it would not conflict with its newfound alliance with the peripheral 
nationalists.  Marxism and nationalism clearly did not coalesce.  Firstly, Marxism had an 
international vision and objectives that ultimately surpassed the nation-state.  Secondly, 
nation-building was largely considered a project of the bourgeois elite that had excluded the 
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working classes.  Marxism had been seen as an alternative to nationalism, the workers’ 
revolution making the national question irrelevant (Pastor Verdú, 2007, pp. 193-195).  The 
PSOE’s original vision had been a state based on the Marxist ideology, but which recognized 
the plurality of the nationalities within it (Blas Guerrero, 1989, p. 104).  Future President 
Felipe González pushed for the party’s moderation, which would allow the PSOE to become 
more mainstream, and by the end of the 1970s, the PSOE had abandoned Marxism for the 
more moderate social democracy. 
Another alteration of the PSOE’s tenets was its take on the monarchy.  Spain’s Left 
has traditionally been strongly republican and, therefore, opposed to the existence of the 
monarchy.  Currently reigning King Juan Carlos I played an important role in the democratic 
transition, which had won him great respect from both the international community and the 
Spanish citizenry.  Today, the monarchy continues to enjoy a high level of popular support, 
being one of Spain’s only formal national symbols to do so (Núñez Seixas, 2001, p. 743).  As 
a result of the royal family’s overwhelming popularity, the PSOE has reoriented itself 
increasingly in favor of the monarchy (Balfour and Quiroga, 2007, pp. 164-166).   
Internal Divisions Over the State Model 
Thanks to a series of internal changes and ideological shifts during the transition, the 
PSOE had consolidated its political power by the early 1980s, establishing itself as one of 
Spain’s main parties.  In 1982, the PSOE won its first national elections and would remain in 
government for the next fourteen years.  However, it is also during this period that the 
socialists first began to face fragmentation over the so-called ‘national question.’   
With regard to this question, Balfour and Quiroga (2007) identify three main factions 
of the PSOE which existed until quite recently.  The first, the “neo-regionalists,” calls for a 
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symmetric model of subsidiary and a high level of decentralization, all of which favor the 
regions over the central government.  However, the neo-regionalists are critical of the 
historical regions which, from their point of view, have monopolized political power in the 
name of nationalism.  As such, this faction of the PSOE calls for an equal division of 
competencies among all regions.  Furthermore, the neo-regionalists consider Spain to be the 
only true nation and therefore, the only entity to possess political sovereignty.   
The second faction is comprised of socialist leaders in the three historical regions 
who consider their respective regions to be nations and, as such, Spain a ‘nation of nations.’  
They call for a high degree of decentralization and an asymmetric model of autonomy that 
would grant more competencies to their regions.  Under the leadership of Pasqual Maragall, 
the Catalan Socialist Party (PSC) expressed its support for a ‘differential federalism,’ which 
would grant different degrees of autonomy to particular regions.  This idea was swiftly 
rejected by political leaders in other regions who contended that such a proposal clearly 
tipped the scale in favor of Catalan interests (Pastor Verdú, 2007, p. 203). 
The third and final group is made up of the more conservative wing of the PSOE and 
takes on a much more republican reading of the nationalist debate.  To this faction, Spain is a 
‘nation of citizens,’ who are equal under the law and should, therefore, enjoy the same 
quality of representation and benefits.  Consequently, this group defends the powers of the 
central government and calls for limits to the degree of decentralization. 
In 2003, the PSOE finally settled the debate on Spain’s state model, when party 
leaders met in the northern town of Santillana del Mar to prepare for the upcoming national 
elections.  Following this conference, the PSOE released the so-called “Declaration of 
Santillana,” known under the official title of “La España Plural: La España Constitucional, 
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La España Unida, La España en Positivo” (“Plural Spain: Constitutional Spain, United 
Spain, Spain in a Positive Light”).  This document expressed the party’s full support for the 
State of Autonomies established in the 1978 Constitution, as well as a desire for reforms to 
the Constitution and to the statutes of several autonomous regions, greater European 
integration, and the promotion of constitutional patriotism.   
The declaration was a clear compromise between the three factions of the PSOE.  It 
appeased the first two by lending its support to regional autonomy.  Although it initially 
raised the concerns of the third and more centrist faction of the party, the final version 
included the declaration that equality among citizens took priority over regional autonomy 
(Balfour and Quiroga, 2007, p. 148).  The Declaration of Santillana was an important step in 
balancing national solidarity with regional autonomy. 
2.2 A Bright Future: The PSOE’s Campaign for Modernization and Europeanization 
While appeals to Spain’s historical past have formed a part of the nationalist 
discourse of both ends of the political spectrum, the PSOE and other parties of the Left have 
differentiated themselves from the Right in that they more often refer to the future of Spain 
than to its past, highlighting the bright possibilities yet to come. 
During the 1970s and 1980s, many leaders of the Left shared the idea that Spain’s 
history was one of failure (Balfour and Quiroga, 2007, p. 153).  A popular interpretation of 
Spain’s national reality circulating among historians at the time was that, as a result of 
delayed industrialization and the delayed rise of the middle class, the country had not 
developed a national identity by the end of the nineteenth century as had many other 
European states over the course of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.  As such, appeals 
to Spain’s ‘glorious’ past were not widespread among socialist politicians during this period.  
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However, having consolidated its political power, the PSOE undertook a certain 
‘recuperation’ of national pride in the mid-1980s.  Although avoiding references to historical 
episodes, such as the discovery of the Americas or the unification of Spain by the Catholic 
Monarchs, President Felipe González and other leaders of the PSOE often alluded to the 
progressive philosophies of the Generations of ’98 and ’14.  These two literary movements 
expressed great frustration over the downfallen state of the Spanish political system and 
nation, and called for regeneration, modernization, and ‘Europeanization,’ or an opening up 
to Europe at a time when Spain was very isolated.  These ideas became particularly poignant 
in the 1980s, when Spain underwent its own ‘regeneration.’  González and other leaders of 
the PSOE appealed to these writers’ calls for modernization and Europeanization, understood 
respectively as the signing of the Constitution in 1978 and the entry of Spain into the 
European Economic Community in 1986 (Balfour and Quiroga, 2007, p. 154).  The focus of 
the PSOE’s nationalist discourse was not Spain’s historical past, but rather its future. 
By the 1990s, historians had begun to depart from the previously negative image of 
Spain and instead began to depict Spain as a ‘normal’ European nation-state which, although 
not without its share of peculiarities, was just like other members of the European 
Community.  It is during this period that three modern national mitos, or myths, took shape 
and replaced those that had been projected by the Francoist regime (Balfour and Quiroga, 
2007, pp. 155-156).  First, the transition and the consolidation of democracy became 
synonymous with reconciliation, consensus, and tolerance among Spain’s diverse peoples 
and political ideologies.  Second, Spain was identified with Europe rather than with 
Hispanidad, the Francoist national myth of a common cultural and linguistic heritage linking 
Spain and Latin America.  Third, modernization replaced Franco’s traditionalism as the 
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common national project.  For the first time in over fifty years, Spaniards could be proud to 
belong to a peaceful, modern, European nation. 
2.3 Historical Memory: The PSOE’s Political Weapon 
During the transition, Spain’s main political leaders had silently agreed not to discuss 
the country’s recent history.  This so-called ‘pact of silence’ was considered necessary to 
ensure a peaceful transition.  Moreover, parties on both sides of the political spectrum stood 
to benefit (Balfour and Quiroga, 2007, pp. 158-160).  For the PP’s forerunner, the Alianza 
Popular (Popular Alliance, or AP), downplaying the authoritarian past allowed the party to 
distance itself from the dictatorship and to present itself as democratic.  The PSOE, on the 
other hand, was seen as a ‘new’ party that had emerged after democracy, with its hands clean 
of the Francoist regime.  Why dwell on the dark past when the party could appeal to a future 
filled with opportunities? 
By the 1990s, however, the PSOE’s future was not looking quite as bright.  As a 
result of poor economic results and the party’s implication in numerous scandals, support for 
the PSOE began to wane, and in 1996, the party lost national elections for the first time since 
1982.  The newly-elected Partido Popular (PP) ushered in a variety of changes, among them 
a greater emphasis on Spanish nationalism.  President José María Aznar and other leaders 
began to employ a nationalist rhetoric that was highly based on Spain’s historical past, as we 
will see later.  In 2000, the PP won a second term, this time with a majority.   
In what Núñez Seixas (2005) regards as a political strategy against the PP, the PSOE 
broke the nearly twenty-year-old pact of silence, bringing the issue of historical memory to 
the surface.  In 2000, the PSOE and its far-left counterpart Izquierda Unida (United Left, or 
IU) presented a proposal to provide economic compensation to those exiled during the Civil 
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War.  Although this proposal was brushed aside by the PP, the PSOE and IU continued 
pressuring the government over the following years, and in 2002, several laws were finally 
approved to provide citizenship rights and monetary compensation to the victims of the War 
(Balfour and Quiroga, 2007, pp. 161-162).  Having returned to power in 2004, the PSOE 
continued its mission to shed light on the long-ignored past through a variety of initiatives 
such as the declaration of 2006 as the “Year of Historical Memory” and the 2007 Law on 
Historical Memory.  
These initiatives were met with great support by a large part of Spanish society.  
According to a survey conducted by Spain’s Center for Sociological Investigation (Centro de 
Investigaciones Sociológicas, or CIS) in 2005, 54.1% of Spaniards favored the adoption of 
some sort of initiative to recognize the victims of the Civil War, while 24.8% opposed it 
(Sanz Ezquerro, 2005).   
The PP and its voters—with their close ties to Franco’s regime—were among those 
opposing the Law on Historical Memory.  The PP’s spokesperson at the time, Eduardo 
Zaplana, argued that the law only opened up old wounds and that the PSOE was using the 
“graves of the Civil War” for its own advantage.  María Teresa Fernández de la Vega, the 
Vice President of Spain and of the PSOE, affirmed that the law concerned the victims of the 
War and their families and nothing more (El País, Nov. 1, 2007).  Regardless of the PSOE’s 
motives, these initiatives were long overdue and marked an important step in coming to 
terms with the Civil War and Franco’s dictatorship.   
In October 2008, Judge Baltasar Garzón of the Spanish National Court went a step 
further, making history when he declared Franco and his accomplices guilty of “crimes 
against humanity” and authorized the criminal investigation of acts committed during the 
 14 
Civil War and the dictatorship (Yoldi, 2008).  While the Law on Historical Memory was 
important for symbolical reasons, Garzón’s investigation of Franco and his cronies marks the 
first legal action taken against them.   
A year has passed since the adoption of the Law on Historical Memory, and little has 
changed with regards to the PP’s position on historical memory and digging up Spain’s 
authoritarian past.  Interestingly enough, however, the PSOE has not been as enthusiastic 
about Garzón’s decision to put Franco and his colleagues to trial as one might have expected.  
President José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero has first and foremost expressed his respect for any 
verdicts the judge reaches, but he has also added, “History has already judged Franco’s 
regime” (Díez, 2008).  The day after Garzón announced the trials, the PSOE’s Congressional 
Secretary General Ramón Jáuregui pointed out that the 2007 law never sought to make a 
general case against Franco’s regime, nor a criminal investigation of it, and called the judicial 
route “dubious at best” (Yoldi, 2008b).  These cautious reactions suggest that even the PSOE 
is wary of jolting the skeletons in Spain’s closet. 
Garzón’s decree—however important it may be—is just another step in the long and 
controversial reconciliation of Spain’s past.  While it is true that the Constitution of 1978, the 
democratic transition, and Europeanization have all become national mitos that mark Spain 
as a peaceful European liberal democracy, the lack of an explicit condemnation of some forty 
years of authoritarianism undermined these myths for a long time.  In addition to Spain’s 
positive identification with the Constitution and the values it represents, there needed to be a 
negative identification of what the nation is not.  The PSOE’s success in passing the Law on 
Historical Memory and Judge Garzón’s efforts to bring Francoist leaders to justice have 
helped to affirm that the Spanish nation as a whole does not defend its violent illiberal past.  
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However, the lack of consensus between the PSOE and the PP on Spain’s historical memory 
stands as an obstacle to the creation of a common national identity. 
2.4 ‘Constitutional Patriotism’: The PSOE’s Reappropriation of Nationalism 
During the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s, the ‘Spanish nation’ had been 
unified around the national projects of democratic consolidation, modernization, and entry 
into the European Community.  Having achieved these goals by the 1990s, many leaders of 
the PSOE felt that Spain was lacking a unifying element, and so they turned to the 
Constitution of 1978 and to Habermas’ ‘constitutional patriotism’ (Balfour and Quiroga, 
2007, pp. 168-169).   
Constitutional patriotism is a concept originally devised by the German philosopher 
Dolf Sternberger in the later 1970s and later made popular by Jürgen Habermas, also a 
German philosopher (Balfour and Quiroga, 2007, p. 167).  According to Habermas (1998), 
rational democratic citizenship could replace nationalism as a means to unite the citizenry. 
In 1991, Habermas presented his concept at a conference in Madrid.  His discourse 
about a new form of patriotism founded in the Constitution attracted the attention of several 
PSOE members in the audience, including Juan José Laborda Martín, a senator from the 
northern city of Burgos.  The following year, Laborda Martín published various articles in 
support of constitutional patriotism.  He placed great emphasis on the differentiation between 
cultural and political nations, an idea which continues to be important to the nationalist 
discourse of the PSOE today. 
In “Patriotas y de Izquierda,” Laborda Martín (2002) heralds the positive aspects of 
constitutional patriotism.  He is clear to distinguish patriotism from nationalism, writing that 
patriotism recognizes the cultural and linguistic complexity of Spain, manifested in the State 
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of Autonomies.  Furthermore, Laborda Martín recognizes the legitimacy of both 
conservatism and reformism, calling for an end to the vicious cycle of disagreement and 
rivalry between the two main political parties in order to guarantee national unity.   
It is important to note that the PSOE’s concept of constitutional patriotism is not one 
and the same as Habermas’ concept (Núñez Seixas, 2005; Bastida Freixedo, 2007).  Núñez 
Seixas (2005) links the PSOE’s concept with the theories of early twentieth-century Spanish 
philosopher José Ortega y Gasset.  For Ortega y Gasset, nationalism was a mix of historical 
determinism and the search for a ‘common project’ for all Spanish people.  In his book 
España invertebrada (“Invertebrate Spain”), Ortega y Gasset explains that a nation is formed 
when a group of elites mobilize the population around the idea of national unity.  However, 
the creation of this nation does not imply the disappearance, nor the denial of the existence, 
of the distinct peoples that constitute it (Blas Guerrero, 1989, pp. 62-63).  Ortega y Gasset’s 
philosophy could be used in coherence with Spain’s Autonomous State because this model 
could be seen as a “regenerative project of Spanish political life” (Blas Guerrero, 1989, p. 
74). 
The conservative wing of the PSOE, which rejects Spain’s multinational character 
and argues for the equality of all citizens and regions, has often appealed to constitutional 
patriotism as an alternative to regionalism.  The leaders of this wing emphasize the 
superiority of a post-nationalist civic identity, such as the one proposed by Habermas, over 
the so-called ‘ethnic nationalisms’ of the Basque Country and Catalonia1 (Balfour and 
                                                 
1As political movements, the Catalan and Basque nationalisms have origins in the late nineteenth century, 
although both claim existence as ‘nations’ since much earlier.  Catalan nationalism has a mixture of political 
roots in the working class movement and cultural-linguistic roots in the Catalan literary movement known as the 
Renaixença.  Basque nationalism evolved as a political movement in reaction to the central government’s 1876 
abolition of the fueros, a special system of taxation and privileges that belonged exclusively to the Basque 
Country and Navarre and that had been around since the Middle Ages.  However, Basque nationalism differs 
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Quiroga, 2007, p. 170). 
Constitutional patriotism has a number of positive qualities that suggest it can offer 
an alternative path to national unity, unlike Franco’s national-Catholicism.  First, it implies a 
civic identity to which citizens can subscribe regardless of their cultural, linguistic, or ethnic 
background.  As such, constitutional patriotism can coexist with Spain’s diverse regional and 
nationalist identities.  Second, it is based on liberal democratic principles and thus, does not 
require adherence to any particular political ideology.  Despite Spain’s authoritarian past, the 
Constitution has the potential to bind citizens together in the twenty-first century. 
Nevertheless, the PSOE’s version of constitutional patriotism has received its share of 
criticism.  Some have argued that it is incapable of integrating the peripheral nationalisms 
into a common national project (Núñez Seixas, 2001; Balfour and Quiroga, 2007).  The 
Constitution is written with the assumption that the Spanish nation exists and that all Spanish 
citizens ascribe to it.  However, there are citizens in Catalonia, the Basque Country, and other 
regions who do not themselves feel a part of this nation, or who do not necessarily agree with 
its existence; these people may have trouble accepting the Constitution as a basis of national 
legitimacy.  One of constitutional patriotism’s toughest critics, Xacobe Bastida Freixedo 
(2007) calls the promotion of constitutional patriotism in Spain an attempt to create 
nationalism without it seeming so.  Bastida Freixedo argues that, while claiming to be 
constitutional, respectful of human rights, and democratic, constitutional patriotism actually 
discriminates against the peripheral nationalisms and denies their right to recognize their own 
nationalist sentiments.  He goes so far as to call the ideology a form of ethnic nationalism 
rather than the civic nationalism it claims to be.   
                                                                                                                                                       
from its Catalan counterpart in that it has certain racial and ethnic implications, effectively making the 
integration of migrants to the region impossible (see Núñez Seixas, 1999). 
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Leaders of the PSOE have themselves acknowledged that the Constitution alone 
cannot serve as a strong basis of Spanish identity.  After all, it is a political document that 
would form a very impersonal basis of linking the Spanish citizenry. 
Furthermore, the promotion of constitutional patriotism has had an important 
undesired effect: it has converted the Constitution into an almost sacred text.  This is evident 
from the way that many scholars and politicians portray the transition and the Constitution.  
In a 2002 essay, Senator Laborda Martín writes that Spaniards should be proud of 1978, the 
year that they achieved a political change “based in liberty.”  Laborda Martín refers to this 
change and to the Constitution from an almost reverent point of view, suggesting that 
regardless of political leanings, no one can deny the inherently positive nature and outcome 
of the transition.  Renowned Spanish historians Juan Pablo Fusi and Jordi Palafox (1997) 
make similar assumptions: “The transition from the dictatorship to the democracy was […] a 
model operation, a great historical success. […] The transition […] was, as we have said, an 
extraordinary political achievement” (pp. 369-370). 
As a result of this glorification of the Constitution, a phenomenon which Balfour and 
Quiroga (2007) call its “petrification” has occurred, limiting the possibilities to reform or 
alter the document.  The PSOE’s promotion of constitutional patriotism has, in some ways, 
backfired because, instead of fostering national unity, it has contributed to division.  The 
PSOE faces constant pressure from the peripheral nationalists, as several regions have put 
forth statutes that clearly defy the Constitution.  The proposed Statute of Autonomy of the 
Basque Country, known as the Ibarretxe Plan for the Basque president of the same name, has 
been perhaps the most radical.  This statute would recognize the region’s right to self-
determination and proposes, among other things, a referendum to decide the future political 
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status of the Basque Country.  Furthermore, the PP increasingly ascribes an unchangeable, 
almost-sacred character to the Constitution and resists calls for amendments to it, severely 
limiting the PSOE’s options for resolving Spain’s increasingly critical ‘national problem’ 
(Núñez Seixas, 2005, p. 131). 
 
III. THE PARTIDO POPULAR’S STRUGGLE WITH THE PAST 
 
Founded in 1989 with José María Aznar at its head, the PP is undoubtedly rooted in 
Francoism.  Its predecessor was the Alianza Popular (Popular Alliance, or AP), a party 
founded by former Francoist minister Manuel Fraga2.  The party was formed out of a fusion 
of several Christian Democrat parties, including the Unión del Centro Democrático (Union 
of the Democratic Center, or UCD) and a reorganized AP, as leaders attempted to move 
closer to the political Center in hopes of reaching a greater constituency (Balfour, 2005, pp. 
147-149).  Today, many of the PP’s leaders are descendents of the dictatorship’s political 
elite.   
 As a result of these connections with Spain’s darker past, the PP has battled for 
political legitimacy since its birth.  Perhaps the biggest struggle has been between the party’s 
traditionalist and modernizing wings.  The traditionalists have favored a classic nationalist 
rhetoric, while the modernizers have sought to recreate the image of the PP as a modern 
European political party of the Center.  The solution has been a compromise between the 
two, resulting in a sometimes contradictory nationalist rhetoric: while the peripheral 
nationalists are portrayed as racist and pre-modern, the PP defends its own version of 
‘patriotism’—which is oddly reminiscent of nationalism itself—as necessary for the unity of 
                                                 
2Fraga is an important figure in Spanish politics, highly regarded especially among the right-wing. Under 
Franco, he served as Minister of Information and Tourism and later as Ambassador to the UK. He founded the 
AP in 1977 and continues to been involved in Spanish politics to this very day.  At the ripe old age of 86, Fraga 
serves as Senator for his native region of Galicia.  He is the Founder and Honorary President for Life of the PP 
of Galicia (PP, 2008a). 
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the Spanish nation.  Moreover, the PP has consistently used a strategy of attack against the 
PSOE, most likely because the PP has spent such a large part of its history in the opposition. 
On the question of nationalism, the PP is divided into two main groups at the national 
level (Balfour and Quiroga, 2007, p. 187).  For the first group, the nation is believed to be the 
product of historical determinism.  All of Spain’s historical episodes—the Reconquest of the 
peninsula from the Muslims, the discovery of the Americas, the institution of the 
monarchy—are seen as forces that shaped the Spanish nation.  The second group sees the 
nation from an organic point of view as a living organism that has developed naturally and 
has not relied on people or events to shape it.  Despite these differences in interpretation, 
there are several trends in the PP’s nationalist discourse that are common to the majority of 
the party. 
3.1 Tendencies Within the PP 
Reactionary Nationalism 
One of the main tendencies in the PP’s nationalist discourse is what can be called 
reactionary nationalism, since it feeds off the demands and actions of the periphery 
nationalists.  Since the 1970s, Spain’s democratic Right has monopolized on the 
stigmatization of explicit state nationalism, accusing peripheral nationalists of being 
exclusive, totalitarian, and racist (Núñez Seixas, 2005, p. 123).  Today, the PP continues to 
throw these accusations around, while nationalist leaders in Catalonia and the Basque 
Country often throw them right back, pointing to connections between the PP and Franco’s 
regime.  As Balfour and Quiroga (2007) explain, each side of this debate sees its own 
ideology as true and the other as false, and its relation with the nation as ‘patriotism’ and the 
other as the negatively-connoted ‘nationalism.’  The PP adamantly defends individual rights 
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over collective rights and perceives the periphery nationalists to be a threat to the Spanish 
nation since they constantly highlight cultural and linguistic differences and since some have 
proposed separation from Spain (Núñez Seixas, 2001, pp. 729-730).   
 The use of co-official languages in several of Spain’s regions is among the issues 
upon which reactionary nationalism most often feeds.  The PP has accused several regional 
governments of ‘imposing’ a monolithic culture on all citizens under their power and using 
discriminatory cultural and linguistic policies (Núñez Seixas, 2001, p. 729).  In the PP’s 2008 
electoral manifesto, the party makes several mentions of the “right to education in Castilian 
Spanish,” giving the impression that the co-official languages pose a threat.  Collective rights 
are also portrayed as a threat to “individual liberty,” as the manifesto explains: “A person’s 
birthplace, or cultural, linguistic, or institutional identification, should not entail any sort of 
privilege” (PP, 2008b, pp. 11, 33).   
The activity of the Basque terrorist group ETA only serves as more fuel to the PP’s 
reactionary fire.  Between 1998 and 2004, the PP often expressed a need to honor the 
‘memory’ of the victims of ETA (Núñez Seixas, 2007, pp. 168-169).  Leaders of the PP have 
accused Zapatero’s administration on numerous occasions of being soft on the terrorist group 
and of “betraying the dead” (El País, Mar. 23, 2006).  Through the use of this sort of 
emotional language, the PP seeks to portray the PSOE’s anti-terrorist policies as ineffective 
in order to woo dissatisfied voters. 
 Since losing the 2004 general elections, the PP has taken the offensive, using a 
rhetoric that suggests the demands of the peripheral nationalists and the PSOE’s concessions 
to them are threatening the stability of the Spanish nation-state.  On several occasions, party 
leaders have warned that the demands of the peripheral nationalists will lead to the 
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‘Balkanization’ of Spain.  In September of 2005, former President José María Aznar told a 
notable Argentine newspaper that Spain was “at risk of Balkanization” as a result of the 
PSOE’s concessions to the Basque and Catalan nationalists.  Aznar accused the nationalists 
of being “very bold” and the Zapatero administration of being “mistaken and weak” (El 
Mundo, Sept. 7, 2005).  In March of 2006, Senator Manuel Fraga reaffirmed these 
accusations during the PP’s National Convention, sarcastically asking if the country had 
anything to gain from this so-called Balkanization (El Faro de Vigo, Mar. 4, 2006).  The PP 
has often used such fiery rhetoric to incite fear, anger, and indignation among the 
constituency.  However, this rhetoric comes more as a strategy of attack against the PP’s 
political enemies than out of any actual fears about the future stability of Spain. 
Reactionary nationalism was particularly prominent in the 1990s, as a reaction to the 
PSOE’s reliance on Basque and Catalan nationalists to maintain majority in the government 
(Núñez Seixas, 2007, p. 168).  However, the PP began to put special emphasis on Spain’s 
cultural diversity in the months leading up to the 1996 national elections, most likely because 
party leaders knew they would need the support of the nationalists to be able to form a 
government once elected (Balfour and Quiroga, 2007, pp. 200-201).  In fact, the PP did just 
that, forming a coalition with the Partido Nacionalista Vasco (Basque Nationalist Party, or 
PNV) and the Catalan nationalist party Convergencia i Uniò (CiU) in 1996.  Although the PP 
shared some consensus with these parties over socio-economic policies, the three were 
clearly divided over the “status of nation, state, and region” (Balfour, 2005, p. 154).  In order 
to ensure their support, the PP made several concessions, including greater devolution of 
powers to regional governments, a principle which the party has traditionally opposed. 
By 2000, the PP had consolidated its power, winning a majority in that year’s 
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elections and no longer needing the help of the nationalist parties.  Instead, the PP focused on 
modernizing the party, in an attempt to further distance itself from Franco’s regime (Balfour 
and Quiroga, 2007, pp. 201-203).  These efforts, combined with the ever-present demands of 
the peripheral nationalists, stirred the PP to adopt and to adapt the PSOE’s concept of 
constitutional patriotism, as we will see later in this paper. 
Regionalist Variants 
 Although the focus of this paper is the discourse of the PP and the PSOE at the 
national level, it is important to note the existence of regional variants since each of these 
parties has a considerable presence at the regional level3.  In the PP, the regionalist variant 
seeks to combine loyalty to the Spanish Constitution and nation with greater regional 
identification, and has been particularly successful in Galicia and the Balearic Islands, where 
the PP (and before its foundation, the AP and UCD) has enjoyed electoral success since the 
early 1980s (Núñez Seixas, 2001, p. 732).  Like its counterpart in the Left, this variant of the 
PP has supported the principle of subsidiary and the need for decentralization.  It has, at 
times, clashed with the centrist sectors of the PP, although its leaders are clear to differentiate 
between “healthy regionalism” and self-determination, which is seen as strictly unacceptable 
(Núñez Seixas, 2005, pp. 128-129). 
Between 1995 and 1999, the PP won elections in several regional governments, 
including Valencia, the Balearic Islands and Aragon.  Many party leaders at the national level 
praised these regions as being part of a new, ‘non-nationalist’ periphery.  However, certain 
                                                 
3The PP has enjoyed great electoral success in several regions.  However, there are some regions where the PP’s 
success has been marginal; most notably, Catalonia.  In this region, CiU—a Catalan nationalist party with 
center-Right political leanings—had enjoyed electoral hegemony for some 23 years before losing the majority 
in the Catalan parliament to the Partits dels Socialistes de Catalunya (Catalan Socialist Party) in 2003.  Today, 
a coalition of three leftist parties governs the region, while CiU and the Catalan division of the PP form the 
opposition (El País, Nov. 24, 2006).  The PP is the fourth largest party in terms of representation in the Catalan 
parliament (El Mundo, 2006). 
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members of the PP’s more centrist wing became uneasy about the growing power of these 
regional elites (Balfour and Quiroga, 2007, p. 204).  One of the most problematic policy 
issues is the division of competencies between the central and regional governments.  The PP 
has traditionally favored a greater distribution of power to the center and an equal 
distribution among Spain’s seventeen Autonomous Communities.  In recent years, however, 
there has been a split within the party between so-called ‘traditionalists,’ who call for this 
equality, and ‘modernists,’ who insist on an asymmetric distribution of competencies, 
granting greater autonomy to some Communities.  Many of these modernists are from 
Communities which have traditionally developed separate identities, such as Catalonia and 
Valencia (Balfour and Quiroga, 2007, pp. 127-128). 
National-Catholicism Revisited 
Several parties of Spain’s extreme Right continue to display what Núñez Seixas 
(2001) refers to as “national-Catholic nostalgia” for their similarities to Franco’s brand of 
nationalism.  These parties exhibit nostalgia for the pre-modern Spanish Empire and cultural 
imperialism in Latin America.  They strictly oppose Spain’s integration into the European 
Union and deny the existence of Spain’s diversity.  It is important to note that the parties 
adhering to this ideology are far from mainstream and have had minimal electoral success.  
However, remnants of this so-called national-Catholic nostalgia have occasionally shown up 
in the PP’s discourse, particularly among older leaders (Núñez Seixas, 2005, pp. 127).  The 
existence of such discourse is problematic because of links between Spain’s democratic 
Right and the dictatorship.  Progressive members of the Right have been striving to dispel the 
‘fascist’ label for over thirty years, and the use of rhetoric that is in any way reminiscent of 
Franco’s regime is a step backwards. 
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A number of characteristics of the PP’s nationalist discourse have been likened to 
those of the dictatorship.  For example, during Aznar’s administration, the party showed a 
great affinity for the use of national symbols and public ceremony to promote Spanish 
identity and national pride (Balfour and Quiroga, 2007, p. 220).  In 2000, party leaders 
proclaimed the necessity to recuperate mass patriotic ceremonies and the use of national 
symbols (Núñez Seixas, 2007, p. 176).  In 2002, the PP government erected a Spanish flag 
measuring 965-square feet (294-square meters) in Madrid’s Plaza de Colón.  The largest of 
its kind in all of Spain, the flag became the subject of controversy in October of that year, 
when Minister of Defense Federico Trillo-Figueroa and Madrid’s Mayor José María Álvarez 
del Manzano—both of the PP—held an official ceremony in its honor.  This tradition—to be 
carried out monthly thereafter—is normally reserved for the military or for national holidays.  
Furthermore, the two leaders insinuated that the ceremony was a ‘timely reminder’ of the 
“integrity of Spain,” referring to contemporary developments in the Basque separatist 
movement.  Needless to say, this outraged members of the PNV, PSOE, and other parties in 
the opposition (González and Díez, 2002).  Although the PP has since moderated its stance, 
the party’s 2008 electoral manifesto includes a section devoted to “language and symbols.”  
Here, the PP calls a “lack of respect for the symbols […] an attack on our constitutional 
model.”  Moreover, the misuse of the flag can be understood as a territory’s desire to deny 
that it forms part of Spain (PP, 2008b, p. 38). 
Francoist public symbols, such as streets and town squares named after the regime’s 
top military officials or statues of the dictator himself, were widespread until recently.  
However, other reminders of the regime remain, such as patriotic holidays, the most 
prominent being the celebration of Spain’s national day on October 12.  This day, coinciding 
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with the anniversary of Christopher Columbus’s discovery of the Americas, had been named 
the national holiday by Franco in commemoration of the national mito of Hispanidad, or the 
brotherhood between Spain and Latin America.  In Madrid, this day has been celebrated 
annually with a military parade attended by the King and major politicians.  There seems to 
be a contradiction in the fact that October 12 continues to be Spain’s national day instead of 
December 6, the anniversary of the signing of the Constitution. 
Another issue linking the PP to Spain’s more backward past has been its attitude 
towards the European Union.  Some party members have suggested that European integration 
has detracted from the national project in Spain, diluting Spanish national identity in favor of 
a ‘weaker’ cosmopolitan identity.  Of course, the modernizing members of the party strictly 
reject such discourse.  Former Catalan senator and current Member of the European 
Parliament, Aleix Vidal-Quadras, and other pro-EU members of the party have contended 
that European identity is compatible with the Spanish one and may even help to overcome 
what some call the “archaic” peripheral nationalisms (Balfour and Quiroga, 2007, p. 219). 
Neo-Regenerationism   
 Another attribute of the PP’s nationalist discourse is its emphasis on Spain’s historic 
past.  As mentioned earlier, some party members subscribe to historical determinism to 
explain the origin of the Spanish nation, while others have taken on a more organic approach.  
Nonetheless, both place great importance on Spain’s history, perceived as the basis of 
national legitimization.  This traditionalist view of nationalism and nation-building sharply 
contrasts with the PSOE’s modernist version, which places greater emphasis on the future. 
 As we saw in the previous section of this paper, Spanish historians painted a rather 
negative image of the nation’s past for the greater part of the 1980s.  As such, most parties 
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stayed away from referencing it, although the Right has traditionally favored history as a 
basis for nationalism, often using interpretations similar to those used by Franco (Balfour and 
Quiroga, 2007, pp. 184-190).  For example, the PP has highlighted the Reconquest of the 
Iberian Peninsula from the Muslims in the Middle Ages as one of the nation’s greatest 
achievements and emphasized the importance of the Catholic Monarchs in unifying Spain in 
the fifteenth century (Núñez Seixas, 2001, p. 729).   
The positive change in interpretations of Spain’s past that took place in the 1990s was 
particularly important for the PP since it allowed leaders—particularly party leader and 
future Spanish president Aznar—to reference Spanish history in a positive light during their 
nationalist discourse (Balfour and Quiroga, 2007, p. 156).  Once in power, the Aznar 
administration often attempted to ‘reinterpret’ history in a way that would “promote Spanish 
unity” (Núñez Seixas, 2005, pp. 136-137).  Núñez Seixas (2001) has called this tendency of 
the PP “neo-regenerationism” for its attempts to appropriate the republican reformism of the 
early twentieth century.  This includes highlighting the more ‘common’ elements to all 
regions and the more positive historical episodes, such as the Restoration period of the late 
nineteenth century, the 1876 Constitution, and Spain’s Second Republic.  In several public 
discourses, President Aznar referred to Spain as a long-lasting historical and political reality, 
a nation based on the principles of “democracy, cultural plurality, and progress,” with a ‘brief 
interruption’ between 1936 and 1978 (Núñez Seixas, 2001, p. 731).   
At the same, the Aznar administration attempted to downplay the more negative 
aspects of Spanish history.  For example, the literary movements of the Generation of ’98 
and ’14 were depicted as pessimistic movements which clouded the view of liberalism, 
eventually giving way to the Civil War and the dictatorship (Núñez Seixas, 2005, p. 137). 
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 Today, the PP continues to define the Spanish nation through its historical past, while 
distancing itself from the dictatorship.  In the introduction to its 2008 electoral manifesto, the 
party identifies itself as “a young party that has been born and raised with this democracy, 
and which assumes the tradition of Spanish liberalism that emerged with the Constitution of 
Cádiz [of 1812]” (PP, 2008b, p. 8).   
3.2 The PP’s Adoption—and Adaptation—of Constitutional Patriotism 
At the PP’s fourteenth annual National Congress, held in 2002, Foreign Minister 
Josep Piqué and the president of the PP in the Basque Country María San Gil addressed 
fellow party members, calling for a new Spanish nationalism based on the Constitution.  This 
new ‘constitutional patriotism,’ as it would be called, reaffirmed the concept of the “unity of 
the nation of Spain” and defended it against certain regions’ demands for self-determination.  
The proposal met overwhelming approval from party leaders, although not without some 
reservations on the part of the party’s more traditionalist wing (El País, Jan. 26, 2002).   
According to the PP’s interpretation of constitutional patriotism, Spain is defined as a 
“plural nation” with constitutional values.  Moreover, the Constitution and the democratic 
transition are seen as great national achievements (Núñez Seixas, 2005, pp. 133-134).  This 
interpretation of the past has led to frequent clashes with the PSOE, such as the debate about 
constitutional reforms and the 2007 Law on Historical Memory, as we will see in the 
following section of this paper.  Moreover, the introduction of constitutional patriotism has 
had a profound effect on the PP’s internal politics.  The influence of the regionalist variant 
has reduced considerably since 2000, as the concept of constitutional patriotism takes hold as 
the predominant nationalist ideology (Núñez Seixas, 2005, p. 129). 
 Just as the PSOE has been criticized for straying from Habermas’ original concept, 
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the PP has been accused of adapting constitutional patriotism to its own right-wing agenda.  
Núñez Seixas (2005) argues that the PP’s version of constitutional patriotism is problematic 
because, unlike Habermas had originally intended, the PP has not explicitly condemned 
Spain’s fascist past, nor helped to create a broad, anti-fascist consensus upon which to base 
Spain’s unity.  Furthermore, several scholars (Balfour and Quiroga, 2007; Bastida Freixedo, 
2007; Núñez Seixas, 2007) have pointed out the contradictory nature of the PP’s 
interpretation; indeed, the PP’s brand of constitutional patriotism does not seem far from a 
constitutional nationalism.   
 Although the terms ‘patriotism’ and ‘nationalism’ are often used interchangeably, 
there is in fact an important difference between the two.  Kwame Anthony Appiah, a 
professor of philosophy from Princeton University, suggests that nationalism is a political 
ideology (Balfour and Quiroga, 2007, p. 23).  Patriotism, on the other hand, is more of an 
emotional sentiment of attachment to one’s homeland.  Thus, when citizens feel proud to 
belong to a particular nation, they are expressing patriotism.  However, once these feelings 
are used to justify actions, they cease to be patriotism and are, instead, a manifestation of 
nationalism.  Thus, the PP’s version of constitutional ‘patriotism’ is more indicative of 
constitutional ‘nationalism’ because it is used to justify the party’s nationalizing policies: 
resistance of Constitutional reform, attitudes towards the peripheral nationalists, use of 
national symbols, and other policy areas. 
3.3 Forget About It: The PP and Historical Memory 
As we have seen, Spain’s democratic transition was characterized by compromises 
from both sides of the political spectrum in order to avoid bloodshed.  The democratic Right 
sought to create a new ‘political culture’ that would be acceptable to the majority—including 
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Franco’s former supporters and the opposition to the regime.  This meant resituating itself 
between the dictatorship and a new form of conservatism.  At the time of the transition, a 
large part of the two main right-wing parties, the UCD and the AP, was directly implicated in 
Franco’s regime, making it impossible for these parties to blatantly denounce the 
dictatorship.  Furthermore, the UCD and AP relied on the votes of an electorate that had 
supported Franco (Balfour and Quiroga, 2007, p. 182). 
Moreover, the nature of the transition prevented Spain from ever truly confronting its 
fascist past, as many other European democracies had already.  Spain’s democratic Right has 
demonstrated a long-lasting desire to forget and “put aside” ‘shameful’ episodes of the past 
for the “sake of Spain’s unity” (Núñez Seixas, 2005, p. 135).   
It comes as no surprise that when the Congress declared 2006 the “Year of Historical 
Memory,” the PP found itself the only political party in opposition, proposing instead a 
“Year of Concordance.”  This proposal was swiftly rejected in favor of the original 
(20minutos.es, Apr. 27, 2006).  That same year, the PSOE tried to raise support for a law that 
would officially recognize the illegality of the 1936 military coup and the dictatorship of 
Franco, and require Spain’s municipalities to remove all Francoist public symbols.  The PP 
firmly rejected these initiatives, calling them “an attack on the transition.”  The only other 
party to veto the law was the Esquerra Republicana de Cataluña (Republican Left of 
Catalonia, or ERC), a left-wing Catalan separatist party, on the grounds that the law did not 
go far enough to overturn Francoist judicial verdicts (El País, Oct. 9, 2007).   
The Law on Historical Memory was finally passed on October 31, 2007, despite the 
PP and ERC’s disapproval.  It marked a major step in Spain coming to terms with its 
authoritarian past.  However, to a certain extent the PP’s lack of support for the law 
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undermined what could have been a path to greater national unity.  Spain’s second largest 
national party had not joined in this explicit condemnation of fascism; this represented a 
major symbolic blow for reconciliation. 
When Judge Baltasar Garzón of the National Court authorized the investigation of 
atrocities committed during the Civil War and the dictatorship in October 2008, the PP 
reaffirmed many of its earlier protests.  The party’s spokesperson for justice Agustín Conde 
said that Garzón had “lost his bearings” and made a decision that would “reopen wounds that 
had been happily sealed” (El País, Oct. 17, 2008).  Manuel Fraga called the decision “a 
foolish act” and “a very serious error.”  He also called into question Garzón’s jurisdiction to 
bring Francoist leaders to trial due to existing “amnesty laws” (referring to a 1977 law that 
had been intended to facilitate a peaceful transition) (Yoldi, 2008b). 
As we saw in the previous section of this paper, the PSOE has also been hesitant to 
lend its support to this legal investigation.  The Spanish Attorney General has challenged 
Garzón’s jurisdiction over crimes committed decades ago, and it remains questionable 
whether they will ever be put to trial (Yoldi, 2008c).  Perhaps this is the end of the road for 
reconciliation between the two sides of Spain’s Civil War, as now both major political parties 
refuse to lend their backing, or perhaps they will come around as time passes.  What remains 
clear, however, is that the lack of consensus between the PP and the PSOE on the nature of 
Franco’s 1939 military coup and his nearly forty years as dictator of Spain stands as an 
obstacle to creating an anti-fascist consensus, which would affirm Spain’s identity as a 




 Since the democratic transition in the late 1970s, Spain’s main political parties have 
been striving to gain their footing on the subject of nationalism.  The delegitimization of 
Spanish nationalism and the simultaneous empowerment of peripheral nationalisms have 
made this a difficult task.  Both the PSOE and the PP have borrowed ideas from the past, 
such as early-twentieth-century regenerationism and liberal democratic ideals from Spain’s 
Second Republic, and from philosophies, such as Habermas’ constitutional patriotism, that 
have found success in other post-dictatorial societies.  Both parties have also suffered internal 
divisions over the debate between national solidarity and the degree of regional identification 
and autonomy.  The articulation of Spanish political nationalism remains weak and 
ambiguous, as politicians from both sides continue to avoid discourses that might be 
negatively interpreted as ‘nationalist,’ opting instead for the more positively connoted 
‘patriotism.’ 
 In this paper, I have shown the existence of four factors that have affected the 
evolution of the PSOE and PP’s nationalist discourses: historians’ interpretations of Spain’s 
national identity and past; political alignment on the Left or Right; whether the party is in 
government or the opposition; and the degree of reliance on peripheral nationalist parties for 
electoral success. 
Provided the constantly changing trends in historical research, historians’ 
interpretations of Spain’s national identity and past have influenced how political parties 
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relate to the nation.  As we saw earlier, historians in the 1980s presented an image of Spain 
as a backward country that had missed the projects of nation-building, industrialization, and 
democratization that other European states had experienced more than a century before.  As a 
result, neither the PSOE nor the PP dared to suggest otherwise.  Both parties opted to 
downplay the history of Spain as a marker of national identity.  Instead, the PSOE 
emphasized common national projects, such as modernization and Europeanization.  
Although the PP as such was not on the scene in the 1980s, its predecessor the AP limited its 
historical references during this period.  When historians shifted towards a more positive 
representation of Spanish history in the 1990s, both the PSOE and the PP monopolized on 
this, comparing themselves to leaders from Spain’s Second Republic and changing to a more 
history-oriented image of the nation. 
Another factor affecting a party’s nationalist discourse is its alignment on the political 
spectrum.  While parties on the Right have traditionally been more inclined to use nationalist 
rhetoric, they have also had to be more wary of it in order to avoid their association with 
authoritarianism.  Parties on the Left have less frequently relied on nationalist rhetoric to 
bolster electoral support, but when they have, these parties have not had to face the same 
prejudices as their right-wing counterparts.  
As a result of the stigmatization of Spanish nationalism during the dictatorship, both 
the PSOE and PP have been cautious in their use of nationalist rhetoric, preferring the more 
neutral term ‘patriotism.’  However, as a result of the Right’s historical and ideological ties 
with the Francoist regime, the PP has faced greater challenges in establishing its legitimacy 
as a liberal democratic party.  Its use of nationalist rhetoric has been subject to greater 
scrutiny than that of the PSOE and other leftist parties.  To overcome these difficulties, the 
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PP moderated its nationalist discourse in its early years as a political party.  Today the party 
continues to receive criticism for its often contradictory and sometimes illiberal 
interpretations of patriotism, suggesting that as a party of the democratic Right, the PP will 
always face certain obstacles to its uninhibited use of nationalist discourse.  The PSOE, 
meanwhile, has enjoyed greater freedom in its use of such discourse since it has not had to 
answer to an authoritarian past.  As a leftist party, it has not traditionally placed much 
emphasis on nationalism anyway, having sided with the peripheral nationalists on many 
issues over the last thirty years.  However, when the PSOE has brought up Spanish 
nationalism, it has not had to face accusations of fascism and national-Catholicism, as has the 
PP. 
Whether the party is in government or in the opposition has also shaped its nationalist 
discourse: the party in power has usually been less restrained, while the opposition has taken 
the offensive against its enemies.  During the PSOE’s first fourteen years in power, party 
leaders often called Spain’s modernization and Europeanization ‘common national projects,’ 
and President Felipe González proudly compared his party to early-twentieth-century 
reformist movements.  During this time, the PP often attacked the PSOE for conceding to the 
demands of the peripheral nationalists, with whom it shared power at the national level.  
When the tables turned and the PP won the 1996 national elections, the PSOE went on the 
offense, this time bringing to the surface historical memory and the role of the Right during 
the Civil War and dictatorship.  Meanwhile, the PP undertook a campaign of 
‘renationalization,’ in efforts to rejuvenate public displays of patriotism and the use of 
national symbols.  After winning its second straight elections in 2000, the PP adopted its own 
version of constitutional patriotism.  However, the party returned to the opposition in 2004 
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and has since retaken its attack against the PSOE, accusing party leaders of risking the 
‘Balkanization’ of Spain by siding with peripheral nationalists. 
This leads us to another factor affecting nationalist discourse: the degree of reliance 
on peripheral nationalists for electoral success.  The PSOE has in many ways manipulated 
the support of the nationalists since it was first legalized as a political party in the late 1970s.  
It has had a long tradition of cooperation with the peripheral nationalists, always lending its 
support to regional autonomy and the recognition of cultural and linguistic rights.  Although 
the Right had traditionally rejected the cultural and linguistic diversity of Spain, the PP 
became more tolerant of the nationalists in efforts to become part of the mainstream.  
However, for the first half of the 1990s, the PP was quick to criticize the PSOE for conceding 
to their demands, provided that the PSOE was governing in coalition with Basque and 
Catalan parties from 1993 to 1996.  Naturally, the PP was forced to moderate this position 
when it needed the nationalists’ support to form a government in 1996 and during the next 
eight years, made a number of concessions to them as well. 
 Although all of these factors have helped to steer the direction of these parties’ 
nationalist discourses, the underlying factor is electoral success; both the PSOE and PP have 
been driven largely by political motives.  After all, party leaders are not philosophers seeking 
to create an ideal image of the ‘nation,’ but rather, they are politicians whose actions and 
public discourses seek to win votes and increase their power.  This explains why a party’s 
position either in government or in the opposition and its degree of reliance on peripheral 
nationalists have had such a strong effect on the evolution of nationalist discourse. 
Despite coming from two ends of the political spectrum, Spain’s two main political 
parties, the PSOE and the PP, do not differ a great deal in their understanding of Spanish 
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nationalism today.  Over the course of thirty years, the two have gradually converged on the 
nationalist ideology of constitutional patriotism.  Despite subtle differences between each 
party’s respective interpretations of the concept, there is no doubt that the PSOE and PP 
agree that the Constitution of 1978 forms the basis of the Spanish nation and gives legitimacy 
to its existence as such.  Perhaps each party’s ability to adapt to the political circumstances 
and to moderate its nationalist discourse when necessary explains why these two are the 
dominant political parties in Spain. 
An area where these parties do differ a great deal is their respective interpretations of 
Spain’s historical past.  This carries over to how they understand constitutional patriotism 
and how they articulate their nationalist discourses.  The PSOE focuses always on the future: 
the establishment of a common national project and the union of Spain’s peoples around the 
liberal values embodied in the Constitution of 1978.  The PP has always placed an emphasis 
on Spain’s ‘glorious’ past: the Reconquest, the discovery of the Americas, the Second 
Republic, and the democratic transition.  However, both parties exhibit a marked avoidance 
of the part of Spain’s history which is most resonant today: the Civil War and the dictatorship 
of Francisco Franco.  
 Efforts such as the 2007 Law on Historical Memory have been an extraordinary step 
in coming to terms with the recent past.  However, the lack of an ‘anti-fascist’ consensus 
between Spain’s two main political parties stands as a major obstacle to solving the country’s 
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